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Addressing Systemic Issues in the WTO: 
Lessons from the Singapore Issues 
 
Erick Duchesne*
 
 
Introduction 
 
In 2001, the World Trade Organization (WTO) launched an 
ambitious round of global trade talks named after Doha, the city 
where the Round got under way. The major aims of the Doha 
Development Agenda are to advance the “built-in agenda” left 
over from the Uruguay Round, namely to liberalize trade in ser-
vices and agricultural products; to further reduce tariffs on in-
dustrial goods; to address institutional governance and systemic 
issues facing the WTO; and most importantly, to address perva-
sive development-related features of trade. As part of this 
                                                 
* At the time of writing this chapter, Erick Duchesne was Assistant Pro-
fessor, Political Science Department, University at Buffalo, SUNY. As of 
June 1, 2004, he is an Assistant Professor, Département de science Politique, 
Université Laval.  This chapter summarizes research carried out by the au-
thor while serving as Norman Robertson Fellow with the Department of For-
eign Affairs and International Trade from May 1 to August 31, 2003. A copy 
of this paper is also available in John Curtis and Dan Ciuriak, eds., 2005, 
Trade Policy Research 2004, Chapter 3, Ottawa, Minister of Public Works 
and Government Services Canada (also available online at http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/eet/pdf/Trade-Policy-Research-2004-en.pdf) An earlier version 
of this paper was presented at Economic Policy Research Institute (EPRI), 
University of Western Ontario on April 12, 2004.  The paper has benefited 
from the comments of participants at the EPRI workshop and students at-
tending PSC 641 (International Political Economy) at the University at Buf-
falo in the spring semester 2004. The author would like to extend special 
thanks to Dan Ciuriak and John Curtis for their support, guidance, and 
friendship throughout the drafting of this chapter.  Any errors are the respon-
sibility of the author. The views expressed are those of the author and are not 
to be attributed as official views of the Department of International Trade or 
the Government of Canada.   
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agenda, the Doha WTO Ministerial meeting made a so-called 
“soft launch” of the Singapore issues:1 a formal work program 
and expanded consultations on trade facilitation, transparency in 
government procurement, the relationship between trade and 
investment, and the relationship between trade and competition 
policy, with the final decision on the inclusion of these issues in 
the negotiations to have been made at the 5th WTO Ministerial 
meeting in Cancún in September 2003. This latter objective 
proved to be too ambitious: The stock-taking at Cancún ended 
when a group of developing countries led by India, Brazil, and 
South Africa and including China (the so-called G20) walked 
out of the negotiations in protest over proposed investment 
rules. Although the main divide was in the farm subsidy nego-
tiations, the Singapore issues became the “official” culprits for 
the untimely termination of the Ministerial.2
However, the breakdown at Cancún does not necessarily 
signal derailment of the WTO negotiations. Some progress was 
made at Cancún, including the first indication of preparedness 
to deal with the Singapore issues individually rather than as a 
package. Moreover, work goes on in Geneva and capitals to 
forge consensus on the framework for the negotiations (target 
date: end-July 2004) and there are indications in the flurry of 
“mini-Ministerials” that WTO members are primed to politi-
cally jumpstart the trade talks following the 2004 American 
presidential elections and changes in the EU Commission, if not 
before. The present hiatus in negotiations thus provides oppor-
tunity to reflect on the “bien fondé” of the Singapore issues.  
This chapter evaluates the pros and cons of keeping the Sin-
gapore issues on the Doha Round negotiating agenda, not in 
terms of trade theory, which focuses on the economic welfare 
 
1 The Singapore issues take them name from the first WTO Ministerial 
meeting in Singapore in 1996 at which working groups on these issues were 
mandated 
2 For early reactions to the Cancún collapse, see The Economist, “The 
WTO Under Fire”, September 20, 2003. Chapter 1 of this volume surveys 
the state of play post-Cancun with the benefit of further reflection. 
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gains from trade, but through the lens of International Regime 
Theory (IRT), which emphasizes the gains from cooperation.  
International regimes enhance cooperation among sover-
eign nations in various ways, including by: "lengthening the 
shadow of the future", altering the payoffs of a game, institu-
tionalizing the rules of cooperation and defection, providing in-
formation to members, reducing transaction costs, facilitating 
issue linkages, and deflecting domestic lobby pressures. With 
the gradual, on-going change in emphasis of the WTO from 
trade liberalization to more contentious rule making, IRT sug-
gests three specific questions about the inclusion of the Singa-
pore issues in the negotiations: 
(a) Does the WTO, as a by now fairly well established, success-
ful international regime facilitate the development of inter-
national cooperation in these issue areas?  
(b) Looking at the flip side of this coin, would keeping these 
issues on the negotiating agenda constitute a potential stum-
bling block for the Doha Development Agenda? Or do they 
enhance the chances of a successful deal by expanding the 
feasible set of win-win outcomes (taking into account tech-
nical assistance and capacity building to help developing 
countries implement and benefit from these rules)?   
(c) Is the effective “unbundling” of these issues and differentia-
tion in their individual timetables that was signalled at 
Cancún for the better or for the worse? 
This chapter next reviews the negotiating history of the Sin-
gapore issues. It then discusses the WTO's evolution as an in-
ternational regime in terms of the major functions of such re-
gimes as identified in the IRT literature before turning to a con-
sideration of whether bringing these issues into the WTO re-
gime enhances the possibility of increasing international coop-
eration in these issue areas. The final section interprets the de-
velopments at Cancún in light of the preceding analysis. 
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Background & Negotiating History of the Singapore Issues 
 
Traditional trade theories are ill equipped to shed light on what 
occurred at the Cancún WTO Ministerial meeting since the dis-
cussions were less about liberalization of trade than about the 
rules of the international trade and investment game.3 A trade 
agreement appeals to governments if it offers greater welfare 
than would be realized in the absence of such agreement.4 But 
the general consensus amongst economists that trade liberaliza-
tion has an overall net positive impact on welfare (albeit with 
unclear implications for income distribution) might not apply 
seamlessly to rule making.  
For almost fifty years following the Second World War, the 
focus of trade liberalization was the reduction or elimination of 
discrimination against foreign products. The process was 
straightforward: members of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), which subsequently evolved into the WTO, 
agreed not to take trade-restricting actions against their trade 
partners in exchange for reciprocal undertakings from their 
trade partners. By and large, the undertakings (a) were framed 
in terms of policy instruments (tariffs) that could be measured 
(i.e., they applied to transparent forms of trade protection); (b) 
were limited to border measures (giving rise to the characteriza-
tion of deepening of trade relations in this era as "shallow inte-
gration"); and (c) involved restrictions on public policies (i.e., 
they specified what governments would not do), as opposed to 
commitments to implement specific public policies (i.e., speci-
fying what governments must do).  
 
3 Truth be told, multilateral trade negotiations began to touch on domes-
tic regulatory policies in the Kennedy Round. The Tokyo Round is just as 
much known for the various codes that it introduced as for the tariff cuts it 
agreed. Nevertheless, until the Uruguay Round, negotiations on non-tariff 
issues represented a few items out of a larger agenda. In the Doha Round—
agriculture excepted—the focus has been on intrusive regulatory issues. 
4 Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, 1999, “An Economic Theory of 
the GATT,” American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No 1. pp. 215-48. 
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The commitments that underpin shallow integration still 
form the bedrock of the international trade system, but the new 
areas of negotiations involve undertakings that would demand 
reforms of domestic economic regulation, including in the case 
of the Singapore issues, competition law, rules governing for-
eign direct investment (FDI), government procurement policies 
and approaches, and customs and related procedures for proc-
essing imports. Reaching consensus on these regulatory issues 
is more difficult because it involves (in some cases far-
reaching) commitments to restructure domestic laws and regula-
tions—that is to say, "deep integration". Moreover, the change 
in negotiating issues also involves a radical change in negotiat-
ing approach from an exchange of comparable reductions in 
protection (which left economic regulatory frameworks differ-
ent) to different degrees of change towards a common regula-
tory regime (e.g., adopting the same regime for intellectual 
property rights involved little or no change for the US and the 
EU but radical changes for developing countries). 
Writing well before Cancún, Hoekman and Kostecki pro-
vided a clairvoyant outlook on the difficulties that the evolution 
of the WTO agenda portended for the Doha Round: 
Multilateral negotiations on non-border policies, ad-
ministrative procedures and legal regimes have proven 
to be much more complex than traditional trade policy 
talks. It is much more difficult, if not impossible, to 
trade ‘concessions’ – instead the focus revolves around 
the identification of specific rules that should be 
adopted. The disciplines that are proposed by some 
countries may not be in the interest of others. Given 
disparities in power and resources, to a large extent 
negotiations on rules can be expected to reflect the 
agenda of high-income countries (and specific interest 
groups in these countries). In contrast to traditional 
trade liberalization, the rules that emerge in a given 
area may not be consistent with the development pri-
orities of low-income countries. No longer is it the 
case that ‘one size fits all’ is necessarily a good rule. 
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With the gradual demise of tariffs and the ever greater 
prominence of non-tariff, domestic regulatory policies 
– standards, investment regulations, environmental, 
social, or competition norms – there is a danger of 
moving away from positive sum (‘win-win’) games 
towards zero sum situations.5
The growing reaction to this shift in international economic 
policy-making has sparked what some have termed a crisis in 
global governance.6  There are two focal points for this sense of 
crisis: the friction caused by the intrusion of international rules 
into domestic policy-making, which is manifest in the grass-
roots anti-globalization movement;7 and the splintering of inter-
national cooperation, which is manifest in the collapse of the 
negotiations at Cancún and the parallel surge of activity in ne-
 
5 Bernard M. Hoekman and Michel M. Kostecki, 2001, The Political 
Economy of the World Trading System, 2nd ed., New York, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, p. 482. 
6 See for example, Daniel Drache and Sylvia Ostry, "From Doha to 
Kananaskis: The Future of the World Trading System and the Crisis of Gov-
ernance", in John M. Curtis and Dan Ciuriak (eds.), Trade Policy Research 
2002 (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: Ottawa, 
2003): 1-31. 
7 Critics of globalization argue that domestic regulatory power is being 
constrained by international agreements and/or decisions of international 
bodies (such as the WTO's dispute settlement body) that are not elected or 
otherwise lack democratic legitimacy. They are alarmed about growing lob-
bying power of corporations as globalization drives consolidation of busi-
nesses and thus greater industrial concentration, with particular concerns 
being voiced about the ability of multinational firms to lobby for favourable 
tax or regulatory treatment/changes. Others reply that the system is not bro-
ken; community and consumer interest groups can effectively use domestic 
advocacy and consultative processes to get their views reflected at the global 
level. They urge activists to work "within the system". They note that a 
growing number of countries are exercising influence on the tenor or the 
multilateral negations, thus giving an increasing voice to their constituents. 
As Sylvia Ostry has argued, such pluralism in global governance “is not only 
desirable, it is essential to sustaining and extending the rules-based system." 
(Ostry’s emphasis). See, Sylvia Ostry, 1997, The Post-Cold War Trading 
System: Who’s on First? Chicago, University of Chicago Press, p. 239. 
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gotiating bilateral preferential (i.e., discriminatory) agreements. 
While the Singapore issues have helped to sail the WTO into 
the eye of both storms, it is the latter that is of interest here. 
 
Box 1 summarizes the substantive aspects of these issues in 
the WTO negotiations.8  
 
 
Box 1: Substantive aspects of the Singapore Issues in WTO negotiations 
 
Trade and investment.  Key negotiating subjects and principles include: 
? Negotiating modality: similar to commitments on services trade under 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), commitments on 
investment would be for specified matters ("positive list" approach), 
rather than in terms of broad commitments subject to listed exceptions.  
? The balance between the interest of exporters of investments with those 
of importers of investments. 
? Countries’ rights to regulate investment.  
? Development-related issues, including technical cooperation with inter-
national organizations such as the UN Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment (UNCTAD). 
? The public interest and individual countries’ specific circumstances.  
? The scope and definition of various issues namely: transparency, non-
discrimination, exceptions, and balance-of-payments provisions. 
Trade and competition policy. The Doha Declaration instructed the working 
group to clarify the following:  
? Core principles, including transparency, non-discrimination and proce-
dural fairness 
? Provisions with respect to “hardcore cartels” (i.e. those formally set up). 
? Modalities for voluntary cooperation on competition policy among 
WTO member governments 
? Support for progressive reinforcement of competition institutions in 
developing countries through capacity building, including through coop-
eration with organizations such as UNCTAD. 
Trade facilitation.  The Doha Declaration identifies the following issues: 
? Ways to expedite the movement, release and clearance of goods in tran-
sit. 
? Technical assistance and capacity building to assist developing countries 
                                                 
8 For more information, see WTO, "The Doha Declaration explained", 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm.  
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to implement an agreement on trade facilitation. 
Transparency in government procurement. Separate from the plurilateral 
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). 
? Negotiations are to be limited to the transparency aspects and therefore 
the scope for countries to give preferences to domestic supplies and 
suppliers will not be restricted. 
? Development issues such as technical assistance and capacity building. 
 
 
Why, it might be asked, did the WTO take on these issues? 
In the first place, they drill down into domestic regulatory space 
and thus raise governance issues. Moreover, being non-tariff 
measures (NTMs), they tend to be far more complex than recip-
rocal tariff reduction.9  
The first of these issues is at the heart of the longstanding 
divide on the status of the Singapore issues in negotiations that 
is reflected in the annual reports of the working groups submit-
ted to the General Council of the WTO. The European Union 
and, to a lesser extent, the United States have been proponents 
of opening formal negotiations; they have received significant 
support from partners within the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). At the other end of the 
                                                 
9 For example, there is no true and tested way to determine whether a 
non-tariff measure genuinely constitutes a protectionist barrier to interna-
tional commerce versus a necessary element of domestic economic regula-
tion in any given developmental context. Second, the lack of a simple metric 
to quantify the value of concessions further reduces the chances of reaching 
an agreement on a reciprocal package involving NTMs. Third, unlike tariffs, 
NTMs are often "lumpy" (e.g., a measure might either be in place or not, 
with no in-between); this makes it difficult to calibrate concessions to match 
reciprocal offers and complicates a process of incremental liberalization. 
Fourth, unlike tariff cuts, the liberalization of NTMs may require reforms to 
domestic institutions, which can challenge the implementation capacity of 
developing countries. Tariff negotiations have also become complex. Early 
GATT/WTO rounds involved item-by-item concessions. Across-the board 
cuts were introduced in the Kennedy Round, based on a simple linear 50 
percent tariff cut. More complex formulae have since been introduced (e.g., 
the "Swiss" formula currently in vogue) as have and zero-for-zero negotia-
tions. For a full discussion of reciprocal tariff reduction formulae, see 
Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, pp. 122-35. 
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spectrum, some WTO members, typically developing and least 
developed countries10, maintain that the case has not been made 
clearly as to the benefits of introducing such rules into the mul-
tilateral system at this time.  
To complicate matters, India and some others argue that 
there is no clear indication in the Singapore Declaration that the 
Singapore issues fall under the single undertaking prescription. 
This latter principle, first introduced in the Uruguay Round 
agreement, stipulates that virtually every item of the negotiation 
is part of a whole and indivisible package. Some argue that dis-
cussion of the status of Singapore issues under the single under-
taking requirement should only be addressed in the context of 
formal negotiations thereon. 
Considering the difficult task of defining the contours of the 
Singapore issues for negotiation purposes, it came as no sur-
prise to most observers of the WTO that the Cancún Ministerial 
meeting failed to reach consensus on whether to initiate formal 
negotiations on them. However, there were important develop-
ments at Cancún: the Singapore issues were effectively "unbun-
dled" in view of the first sign of flexibility from the EU and 
other key players.11 Each issue must now be considered on its 
 
10 While this chapter distinguishes between developing and least-
developed countries, it should be acknowledged that there are no WTO defi-
nitions of “developed” and “developing” countries. The designation of de-
veloping country is derived from a process of self-selection by certain WTO 
member states and this is not automatically accepted in all WTO bodies. The 
WTO recognizes the designation of least-developed countries for some of its 
members in accordance with the United Nations’ classification. Unless a 
clear distinction between “least developed” and “developing” countries is 
essential, this study will often use the term “developing countries” to refer to 
both of these latter categories.  
11 On the last morning at Cancún, Pascal Lamy, the EU’s chief negotia-
tor, offered to give up the two most controversial Singapore issues, competi-
tion policy and investment, but by then it was too late to salvage the remain-
ing two issues. On this aspect of the negotiating dynamic at Cancún see Pi-
erre Sauvé, "Decrypting Cancún", paper prepared for an "Ad Hoc Expert 
Group Meeting on the Post-Cancún Agenda for WTO Trade Liberalization 
and Its Implications for Developing Economies", United Nations' Economic 
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own merits.12 Some indication of the chances for movement on 
the individual issues can be inferred from a compromise pro-
posal made by the facilitator for these issues at Cancún, Can-
ada's then-Minister for International Trade, Pierre Pettigrew. 
Under this proposal, trade facilitation and transparency in gov-
ernment procurement would form part of the Doha Round, im-
plying optimism about the chances for early forward movement. 
Investment rules would be handled in parallel negotiations with 
no terminal date, suggesting a possibly slower time path. Com-
petition policy would be subject to "the Doha Round”. 
As efforts to revive and advance the Doha Round proceed, 
the shape of the negotiating package—what is to be on the table 
and what is not—remains uncertain. Against this background, 
we now consider what political science theories of international 
regimes say about how well placed the WTO is to address these 
issues.  
 
The WTO through the lens of International Regime Theory 
 
Multilateral cooperation among sovereign nations in the ab-
sence of a central authority is explained by political scientists in 
terms of the concept of an "international regime" which, in 
Krasner’s classic definition, is “a set of implicit or explicit prin-
ciples, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of interna-
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok, 18-19 November 
2003, manuscript, at section (ii) "The Singapore issues: convenient culprits?" 
12 The modified EU position is expressed in European Commission, 
“Singapore issues – Options post-Cancún,” Ref. 514/03, Brussels, 30 Octo-
ber 2003. [http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/Cancún/docs/EC-Sing-Issues-
Post-Cancún.pdf]. The desirability of addressing the Singapore issues on 
their individual merits is strongly supported by several developing countries. 
See World Trade Organization, Trade Negotiations Committee “The Doha 
Agenda: Towards Cancún”, Communication from Argentina, Botswana, 
Brazil, China, Columbia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Guatemala, Hondu-
ras, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, 
TN/C/W/13, 6 June 2003, p. 3. 
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tional relations.”13 How does the WTO stack up in terms of the 
features that make an international regime useful?   
 
Lengthening the Shadow of the Future.  
 
A regime lengthens the shadow of the future by creating an 
expectation among the players that they will interact with each 
other over an indefinite time horizon.14 This allows for a “give-
and-take” process where the players make incremental 
concessions and evaluate the behaviour of their counterparts 
over the long run. This feature of an international regime 
suggests the utility of a “go slow” approach in the 
implementation of new rules to allow all parties to test the 
willingness (and/or ability) of member states to follow up on 
any agreements.  
The history of the multilateral trading system illustrates well 
this aspect of an international regime. The series of multilateral 
negotiations under the GATT/WTO since 1947 furnished 
learning and reputation-building processes that allowed nation-
states to discriminate between “cooperators” and “defectors” 
and to adjust their concessions accordingly. The results speak 
for themselves: eight rounds of trade liberalization have been 
successfully completed, lowering the average tariff from 40 
percent at the beginning of the process to about 4 percent with 
full implementation of the Uruguay Round cuts; trade has 
 
13 Stephen D. Krasner, 1983, “Structural Causes and Regime Conse-
quences: Regimes as Intervening Variables” in Stephen D. Krasner ed., In-
ternational Regimes, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, p. 2. 
14 Readers who are familiar with the Prisoners’ Dilemma situation in 
game theory will recognize that an outcome of mutual cooperation is more 
likely in a repeated game than in a “one-shot” game, where mutual defection 
is the rational outcome (i.e., a unique Nash equilibrium) under the usually 
specified decision rule of risk aversion. The emergence of cooperation in an 
iterated trade and investment game under the aegis of an international regime 
follows the same logic. For more discussion on the Prisoners’ Dilemma, es-
pecially in its iterated version, see among others Robert Axelrod, 1984, The 
Evolution of Cooperation, New York, Basic Books. 
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expanded much faster than global economic activity, more than 
tripling the share of trade in global GDP. While there are many 
exceptions to its rules and many remaining examples of 
protectionism in the world, the current international system is, 
compared to other historical periods, in many respects the freest 
by far.15  
An incremental approach where tractable issues are 
addressed first, paving the way for initiatives to address ever 
more difficult matters, is also a trademark of the GATT/WTO. 
Such an approach provides an opportunity to observe the 
consequences of liberalization and to adjust gradually to the 
new demands of the international economic regime. The 
GATT/WTO experience adds support to neofunctional theorists 
who argue that establishing some degree of cooperation as a 
foothold, however limited, is critically important for long run 
cooperation. 
By lengthening the shadow of the future, an international 
regime such as the WTO facilitates a gradual breakdown of the 
resistance to multilateral disciplines in new issue areas. 
 
Altering the Payoffs of a Game.  
 
An international regime can make cooperation or conflict more 
or less likely by altering the payoffs of a game through "side 
payments" to participants. In the multilateral trade context, 
technical assistance to help developing countries to implement 
and take advantage of trade agreements constitutes such a form 
of payoff alteration. Such side payments were in fact central to 
the launch of the Doha Development Agenda.   
In economic terms, these side payments are made feasible 
by the gains from trade realized by the major trading nations 
that provide or finance the assistance. Their interest in expand-
ing the game leads them to "prime the pump", as it were, to in-
duce wider participation. The role of the international regime is 
 
15 For extensive details on trade openness and structure of trade, see 
Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, pp. 9-18. 
 
 
13
to help overcome the problem of "collective action" implicit in 
trade-related technical assistance. Any single trading nation 
cannot capture the benefits from technical assistance that ex-
pands the multilateral trade of another country; accordingly, it 
has no interest in providing such assistance alone.  The interna-
tional regime, however, allows it to capture a share of the over-
all gain that is, in principle, commensurate with its contribution. 
 
Institutionalizing the Rules of Cooperation and Defection.  
 
International regimes institutionalize rules and norms. This in-
creases the probability of cooperation in two ways. First, par-
ticipants in a system tend to "internalize" norms; this is in fact a 
central tenet of legal theory, which holds that most people, most 
of the time, observe the law, even in circumstances where the 
threat of punishment is absent. Second, a regime can supple-
ment such internalization by making clear what is a defection 
and prescribing commensurate remedies/penalties.  
The history of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mecha-
nism serves to illustrate both aspects. If a member of the WTO 
believes that another is illegally raising barriers to trade, it can 
lodge a complaint under the WTO's Dispute Settlement Under-
standing (DSU), which contains explicit rules for determining if 
a defection has occurred.  If fault is found, the complainant is 
authorized to retaliate to an extent that a WTO panel judges to 
be commensurate with the injury. In WTO parlance, “retalia-
tion” is a “withdrawal of concessions”; typically, this involves 
the raising of tariffs on a specific quantum of imports as author-
ized by the WTO.   
The current WTO DSU builds on earlier, and by general 
reputation much weaker, versions of dispute settlement during 
the GATT era. The GATT system allowed, until 1989, the ap-
pellant to block the formation of a panel to review the case. Af-
ter "improvements" to the system in 1989, an appellant could no 
longer block the formation of a panel but could still block the 
adoption of the panel's report, meaning the system still lacked 
real teeth. The WTO DSU removed the ability of the appellant 
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to block adoption of a panel report since a blocking motion re-
quired "negative consensus"—i.e., all members of the WTO had 
to agree not to adopt. Thus, as Busch and Reinhardt put it: 
The conventional wisdom is that the GATT’s diplo-
matic norms have been supplanted by the WTO’s more 
legalistic architecture, resulting in a system in which 
“right perseveres over might.” 16  
Yet, as Busch and Reinhardt go on to show, the GATT-era 
dispute settlement mechanism was, surprisingly, very "effica-
cious", yielding concessions to the complainant in two-thirds of 
the cases brought.17 Since many of these cases involved power-
ful rich countries making concessions to poor countries that 
lacked the market power and institutional capacity to impose 
effective sanctions, compliance with the GATT rules appears to 
reflect the normative power of the regime itself.   
At the same time, the progressive strengthening of 
GATT/WTO dispute settlement in terms of enforceability testi-
fies to the importance of a "stick" to ensure compliance when 
internalization of norms is insufficient. The rapid expansion of 
the case load of the WTO's DSB since its introduction is seen as 
having been induced by the increased assurance that a victory at 
the panel stage would lead to concrete enforcement action. 
 This principle of international regimes suggests that ideally 
the dispute settlement mechanism would have a role with re-
spect to each new article of the WTO charter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 See Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, "The Evolution of 
GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement" in John M.  Curtis and Dan Ciuriak (Eds.), 
Trade Policy Research 2003 (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade, 2003): 143-183; at p. 143. 
17 Ibid. at p.154. 
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Providing Information to Members 
 
One of the most important functions of a regime (perhaps sur-
prisingly so) is to provide information about the behaviour of 
members covered by the regime as well as about their national 
policy objectives. This information reduces the costs for indi-
vidual members of monitoring each other's compliance and, by 
regularly confirming continued cooperation of others, fosters 
cooperation by all. Information also reduces uncertainty; this is 
important because uncertainty often causes cooperation to break 
down unnecessarily. 
The WTO fulfils this function of an international regime in 
a number of ways.  
First, it provides a forum for continual communication be-
tween member states. For example, WTO members gather regu-
larly in specialized committees, working parties, working 
groups, and Councils, at various levels of government, includ-
ing officials and formal Ministerial meetings, to exchange in-
formation and views. This regular interaction is an efficient 
mechanism to promote cooperation and to avoid potential con-
flicts.  
In addition, under WTO transparency rules (which are fea-
tured in most of the agreements)18, members are required to 
make public their domestic trade regulation. Further, the Trade 
Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) provides for regular moni-
toring of the behaviour of WTO members; importantly, the 
highly detailed TPRM reports on member compliance with the 
rules of the regime enable small and relatively poor countries to 
determine whether others are cooperating or defecting, some-
thing they could ill afford to do independently.19
 
18 The GATS, the GATT, the Agreement on Rules of Origin, the 
Agreement on Import Licensing, the Agreement on Customs Valuation, and 
the Agreement of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights all 
contain provisions related to the transparency of domestic procedures. 
19 The need for transparency during the Doha negotiations is a recurring 
theme for developing countries. See for instance “The Doha Agenda: To-
wards Cancún”, p. 1. 
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Reducing Transaction Costs  
 
Regimes increase the probability of cooperation by reducing 
transaction costs. For example, in order to reach an agreement, 
many procedural issues have to be resolved: a location has to be 
selected; a list of invitees must be determined; various protocols 
(e.g., where people sit) must be established; decision rules for 
choosing policies must be agreed upon. All these choices or de-
cisions, which must be dealt with prior to broaching substantive 
talks, represent overhead costs of doing business in the coopera-
tion game. By establishing rules and decision procedures at the 
start, regimes reduce the cost of all subsequent agreements. In 
other words, regimes deliver cooperation on the cheap. 
In addition, there are major cost savings through the "net-
work externalities" offered by a successful institution.   For ex-
ample, between N countries, there are N(N-1)/2 bilateral rela-
tionships.  While these costs are distributed (no single country 
has more than N-1 relationships to tend), the cumulative costs 
across the system grow rapidly as N rises, increasing the overall 
benefits of a multilateral agreement that covers all at once. 
The GATT/WTO's history of repeated negotiations and 
steady expansion of membership speak for themselves in illus-
trating the first aspect of this function of an international re-
gime. The established modalities/protocols for negotia-
tions/accessions combined with the acquired institutional mem-
ory of the practical aspects of these processes facilitate pro-
gress. Moreover when a new problem is encountered (e.g., how 
to include Hong Kong as a customs territory), the solution can 
be repeated (e.g., for Chinese Taipei). 
As for the network externalities, these have become signifi-
cant. Amongst the 147 WTO members20, there are 10,731 bilat-
 
20 As of April 23, 2004 with Nepal’s accession. See World Trade Or-
ganization, “WTO membership rises to 147”, WTO News, 23 April 2004, 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news04_e/wto_147members_23apr04_e
.htm  
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eral relationships. Adding the 30 current observers (a country 
must begin accession negotiations within five years of becom-
ing an observer) would expand that number by nearly 5,000. 
The more members, the greater the efficiency gains from trans-
acting business through the regime compared to outside it, as 
shown by the rise in the ratio of the number of bilaterals to the 
number of members as the latter number expands. 
 Number of  
Members 
Total number 
of bilaterals 
Ratio: Bilaterals 
to members 
Original GATT 23 253 11 
Current WTO 147 10,731 73 
Current WTO + observers 177 15,576 88 
In view of the powerful incentives to forge agreements at 
the multilateral level, a comment is required on the proliferation 
of regional and bilateral negotiations.  
The answer lies partly in the realities of economic geogra-
phy: most nations transact most of their international commerce 
with their immediate neighbours—that is why regional agree-
ments are in fact regional. The advantages offered by regional 
agreements have been well documented.21  
                                                 
21 Regional trade agreements (RTAs) allow the participating countries 
to extract a good portion of the potential gains from trade in terms of produc-
tion and distributional efficiencies. Negotiating results can be achieved faster 
than is typically possible multilaterally and integration can be deeper. Speed 
can be of the essence in some cases where governments seek to “lock-in” 
domestic economic reform. RTAs have other advantages as well. They can 
serve as a testing ground, pioneering the approaches later adopted multilater-
ally; this was the case with dispute settlement procedures developed in the 
Canada-US free trade agreement that were later incorporated in the dispute 
settlement framework adopted in the Uruguay Round. By the same token, 
experience gained in negotiating RTAs can prepare countries (especially 
developing countries) for the multilateral stage. And by creating broader 
zones of harmonized rules at the regional level, RTAs can speed-up subse-
quent progress at the multilateral level. Finally, a thought-provoking recent 
article provides an empirical test of rent seeking, in which the author demon-
strates under which conditions state leaders might logically prefer to negoti-
ate regional rather than multilateral trade agreements. See Kerry Chase, 
2003, “Economic Interests and Regional Trading Arrangements: The Case of 
NAFTA,” International Organization, Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 137-74. At the 
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The answer also lies partly in the governance-related dis-
economies of scale faced by organizations. These diseconomies 
appear to become significant once the membership of an or-
ganization much exceeds the number of an ideal dinner party—
as the Geneva tradition of restaurants lending their names to 
particular negotiating alliances or "like-minded" groups attests. 
The discontent that has surfaced within the WTO about the 
"green room" and "mini-Ministerial" processes 22 both high-
lights the difficulties of negotiating amongst 147 members at a 
time, which inevitably cause the action to shift to smaller 
groups, and the governance issues thereby raised. 
Finally, the perspective on cost-benefits is quite different 
for a major economy such as the US or the EU versus for a 
small economy negotiating with one of these two, each of which 
accounts for a considerable share of the world economy. There 
are clear advantages for the US to deal one-on-one with smaller 
trading partners for whom access to the huge US market is a 
major factor; these advantages are manifest in the US' ability to 
obtain greater concessions in terms of trade-related intellectual 
same time, they have costs. Proliferation of RTAs creates a complex web of 
preferential tariff rates and rules of origin that divert trade, reducing the 
overall gains from trade. Empirically, the benefits from such arrangements in 
terms of trade creation and acceleration of liberalization are considered to 
outweigh the costs; at the same time, the proliferation of RTAs has made 
multilateral liberalization, which tends to narrow the margin of preferences, 
all the more important. For a recent survey, see John M. Curtis, "The Impor-
tance of Being Multilateral (especially in a regionalizing world)" in John M. 
Curtis and Dan Ciuriak (eds.) Trade Policy Research 2003 (Department of 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade: Ottawa, 2003): 43-71. 
22 Some delegates from developing nations openly lament the lack of 
democracy within the WTO itself. They remark that the ‘green room’ proc-
ess, where a small invited group of members meets informally behind closed 
doors to work out areas of agreement which are then presented to the rest of 
the membership as a fait accompli, and the use of ‘invitation only’ mini-
ministerial meetings relegate plenary sessions to ‘mere sideshows’ where 
most important decisions are already endorsed by powerful delegations. See 
Mark Lynas, “Playing Dirty at the WTO,” The Ecologist, June 2003 
[http://www.theecologist.org/archive_article.html?article=411&category=55]. 
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property and capital movement in bilateral agreements with 
Singapore and Chile than has proved possible in the WTO.  
The outcome of this interplay between the regional and 
multilateral trade regimes is unclear.   
 
Facilitating Issue Linkages 
 
Regimes facilitate issue linkage. Sometimes cooperation on one 
issue is difficult but linking the issue with another increases the 
possibility of cooperation. For example, if a game is essentially 
zero sum, there is no basis for cooperation, only rivalry. How-
ever, if two zero sum games are linked, it becomes possible to 
trade losses in one game for wins in the other. Depending on the 
valuation of the respective gains and losses in the two issue ar-
eas, the linked games can yield positive sums for both players. 
In other words, linkage can create a zone of mutual benefits 
where none exist when the issues are handled separately. 
 The WTO illustrates this property of a regime particularly 
well. For example, in the Uruguay Round, linkage between the 
negotiations on trade-related intellectual property rights 
(TRIPs), agriculture and textiles helped create a package out-
come that satisfied all parties. Linkage has in fact become an 
essential feature of trade liberalization: following the mandated 
launch of negotiations on agriculture and services as per the 
"built-in agenda" agreed in the Uruguay Round, it was generally 
agreed that a new round would have to be launched to suffi-
ciently broaden the set of trade-offs to create the basis for final 
agreements in these two issue areas. 
Linkage is clearly an important consideration with respect 
to the Singapore issues—they were after all linked as a group 
from the time of their entry onto the WTO agenda at the 1996 
Singapore Ministerial until the meetings at Cancún. How they 
will fit into the negotiating agenda post-Cancún—if at all—
remains to be seen. Developing countries had insisted on sub-
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stantial progress on issues within the “development agenda”23 in 
order to consider movement on the Singapore issues, insofar as 
they were willing to countenance them at all.   
Linking issues can also complicate matters—indeed, the 
"poison pill" is an example of the use of linkage as a tactic to 
block progress. Insofar as the constituency for the Singapore is-
sues remains hard to identify (e.g., why was Japan adamant on 
their inclusion in the round to the point of risking collapse of the 
talks?), a good case could be made for “de-linking” the Singapore 
issues from the Doha Round.   
The future of the Singapore issues on the Doha agenda will 
depend on the concessions that the developing economies might 
be ready to make to keep some or all of these issues off the ta-
ble—or alternatively, the concessions that the developed econo-
mies might consider to keep them on the table. 
 
Deflecting domestic lobby pressure 
  
An interesting and controversial feature of international regimes 
is the way governments use them to deflect unwelcome pressure 
from their domestic lobbies.  Domestic reforms that have distri-
butional consequences—e.g., removal of a subsidy—are notori-
ously difficult to make in the face of spirited opposition from 
vested interests.  Nothing is more convenient than to have such 
a subsidy made illegal under an international agreement to 
which the nation is party.  By the same token, the intrusiveness 
of international rule-making into domestic governance has be-
come a persistent source of controversy surrounding interna-
 
23 If we were to define the development agenda as issues where develop-
ing countries hope to make particular gains, a non-exclusive list would in-
clude concessions under the TRIPs agreement for particular health issues 
(especially HIV), expanded trade-related technical assistance, special and 
differential treatment in specific circumstances, and addressing concerns 
related to implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements. This would be 
course in addition to basic market access objectives for agriculture, industrial 
goods and services as well as strengthened disciplines on subsidies and the 
use of anti-dumping and countervailing duties.  
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tional institutions under the general rubric of the so-called "de-
mocratic deficit". Accordingly, use of this feature of an interna-
tional regime increasingly risks attracting as much pressure as it 
might deflect. 
Hoekman and Kostecki eloquently describe this feature of 
the WTO as an international regime: “The WTO is somewhat 
analogous to a mast to which governments can tie themselves so 
as to escape the siren-like calls of various pressure-groups.”24 In 
most countries, diverse groups exhibit dissimilar trade prefer-
ences. The configuration of protection at any given time is the 
product of the interplay between demand for protection ex-
pressed by various interest groups and the supply offered by 
responsive governments, which itself is influenced by the lobby 
pressure from export-intensive industries that stand to benefit 
from reciprocal liberalization. While governments might objec-
tively prefer welfare-enhancing trade liberalization policies over 
sustaining the rents of protection-seekers, political calculation 
might dictate otherwise. The GATT/WTO can help solve the 
political economy problem by “empowering the exporters”25 
while allowing national governments to “tie their hands” 
through binding multilateral agreements to reduce the effective 
supply of protection. Insofar as the WTO enhances trade among 
nations, few analysts would find fault with this—indeed, 
Hoekman and Kostecki present this feature in a very favourable 
light. But would this judgement be carried over to the WTO's 
involvement in rule making?  
There is no easy answer. To the extent that the rules en-
shrined in WTO agreements represent good practice, irrespec-
tive of circumstances, the multilateral trade regime represents 
both a good model to build towards and a useful support to lean 
on while getting there. Unfortunately, there are no guarantees 
that negotiated rules are welfare-enhancing for all, as the WTO 
 
24 Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, p. 29. 
25 To borrow a term popularized by Michael J. Gilligan, 1997, Empower-
ing Exporters: Reciprocity, Delegation, and Collective Action in American 
Trade Policy, Ann Arbor, Michigan University Press. 
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agreement on trade-related intellectual property (TRIPs) has 
served to illustrate.   
It is also more complicated to understand and deal with the 
dynamics of interest groups on rules issues. When it comes to 
investment and competition, it is apparent that multinational 
corporations favour a seamless web of rules, but the lobbies on 
the other side of the equation are not necessarily the traditional 
protection-seekers.  The structure of trade consultations thus is 
forced to evolve to reflect the broader interests involved.26
Here we have to carefully distinguish between the situation 
where governments lean on the WTO agreements to push 
through reforms they believe are in the interests of their own 
country and cases where the rules are more or less "forced" on 
them.  Modern China is often cited as an example where the 
government is said to be purposefully using the WTO agree-
ments to overcome domestic opposition to the market-based 
regulatory framework that it is putting in place. Developing 
countries committed to putting in place regulatory regimes to 
enforce intellectual property rights are often cited as an example 
of the latter, where the rules are not self-evidently in the coun-
try's interests and were adopted under pressure, as the lesser evil 
to being outside the WTO and exposed to unilateral trade sanc-
tions with no procedural protection from the WTO's dispute set-
tlement mechanism. Unfortunately, it is not possible from the 
public record to know which circumstance prevails--in both in-
stances, the government claims that its hand was forced!  
Insofar as the framework of rules enshrined in the WTO 
agreements do not represent optimal policies for all—and the 
risk of this would most likely be highest for countries at an 
early stage of industrialization—this aspect of the WTO as an 
international regime could potentially have some negative con-
 
26 The evolution of Canada's system of trade consultations is described 
in Dan Ciuriak, " Canadian Trade Policy Development: Stakeholder Consul-
tations and Public Policy Research", Chapter 6, in John Curtis and an Ci-
uriak, 2005, Trade Policy Research 2004,  Ottawa, Minister of Public Works 
and Government Services Canada. 
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sequences. Accordingly, even if the WTO were deemed to be a 
successful regime according to the other six criteria discussed 
above, it might still meet with legitimate criticism on this score.  
This issue is likely to play a prominent role in the case of the 
Singapore issues, which are not seen as high priority items for the 
poor countries. Insofar as they remain on the agenda and are part 
of the final Doha Round agreement, there will be much ex post 
analysis of the pros and cons of this role of the WTO. 
 
Summary and future considerations 
 
On the basis of the foregoing, one could safely argue that the 
GATT/WTO has so far been a successful international regime.  
In textbook fashion, it has "lengthened the shadow of the fu-
ture" by creating stable expectations about the conditions under 
which trade will take place; it has altered the payoffs to the 
trade and investment game in a positive direction; it has institu-
tionalized the rules of cooperation and defection, thereby pro-
moting compliance with its rules; it has provided extensive in-
formation to its members to enable them to monitor the behav-
iour of their fellow members, reducing uncertainty about com-
pliance and thereby fostering greater compliance by all; it has 
reduced transaction costs of negotiating treaties on international 
commerce; it has facilitated issue linkage, thereby expanding 
the feasible set of cooperative deals; and it has provided a  
credible international framework that governments have been 
able to use to deflect domestic lobby pressures to push through 
desired reforms.  
Measures of its success abound: the vast expansion of the 
activity which it oversees; the seven-fold expansion of its mem-
bership; the growth in stature and power of its institutions; the 
large number of treaties concluded under its umbrella (including 
the eight rounds with their various component agreements as 
well as the telecommunications and financial services agree-
ments); the many hundreds of disputes that have been brought 
to it for settlement, the majority of which have resulted in set-
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tlement with concessions being made; and the growth of its 
reputation to actually larger than life status.  
The pragmatism and flexibility which the multilateral system 
has shown in accommodating political pressures are arguably re-
sponsible for the long life of the GATT/WTO, which started as a 
provisional regime that, in the eyes of its founders, would last at 
most a year or two. 
But while the foregoing has emphasized the GATT/WTO's 
successes as an international regime, there is also a liability 
column in the GATT/WTO ledger. 
Most importantly from a forward-looking perspective, there 
has been no clear record on its watch of success in integrating 
developing countries into the global economy or "putting trade 
into development": the rhetoric of the day holds that the prob-
lem with globalization for the poor countries is that they are ex-
cluded from it—yet many have long  been GATT/WTO mem-
bers. The perception of lack of benefits from the Uruguay 
Round, the occasion on which many poor developing countries 
joined the club, was in fact a contributing factor to the collapse 
of the Cancún Ministerial as it conditioned their unwillingness 
to enter into negotiations in new rules areas.  While it may be 
unfair to lay the burden of the blame entirely on the 
GATT/WTO,27 it has been a factor in creating a separate trading 
context for developing countries since the 1970s when it intro-
duced systematic discrimination into the trading system through 
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP),28 has long been 
 
27 If we consider the fact that several least developed countries, mainly 
from Sub-Saharan Africa, have no resident representatives in Geneva, it is 
hard to believe that they could have had an informed grasp of the intricacies 
of their WTO obligations when they signed on. The creation of the Advisory 
Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) at the Seattle ministerial meeting was a step 
in the right direction, but even taking resource constraints into account part 
of the responsibility for engaged participation in the Doha Round must come 
from the members themselves. International NGOs have tried to step into the 
breach and offered advisory services to the poor countries, but their tactical 
advice at Cancun has been criticised by some trade professionals. 
28 The GATT Contracting Parties first authorized a GSP scheme in 
1971 through a 10-year waiver to Article I (most-favoured-nation clause) of 
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involved with technical assistance to developing countries to 
help them take advantage of the trading system, and has played 
an advocacy role on behalf of trade liberalization. Whatever it 
has done in these regards has not obviously consistently borne 
fruit.  
Notably, it is the small poor developing countries, which in 
theory should be the major beneficiaries of the rules-based 
framework provided by the WTO, that account for most of the 
disappointments in taking advantage of globalization through 
trade.  
Equally notably, the two major trade and development suc-
cess stories of the past decade or so—China in light manufac-
turing and India in services—forged their successes either en-
tirely outside the framework of the WTO (China joined only in 
2001, long after it had become a major trading nation) or 
through openings driven by commercial innovation rather than 
negotiated reduction of protection (India's exports of services 
through outsourcing did not spring into life due to GATS-driven 
liberalization and thus are in fact vulnerable to protectionist 
measures as the backlash against outsourcing builds).  
Meanwhile, the expansion of its membership is both testa-
ment to the GATT/WTO's success and a complication of its life 
going forward. According to Hoekman and Kostecki, the gov-
ernance issues posed by the expanded membership might be 
among the WTO’s greatest challenges: “How the members 
manage to shift from a ‘traders club’ to a multilateral organiza-
tion in which 141-plus countries express their views and defend 
the Agreement, in response to a 1968 recommendation made by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). A subsequent 
decision of the Contracting Parties on 28 November 1979 (26S/203) titled 
"Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Par-
ticipation of Developing Countries", created a permanent waiver. For further 
background see UNCTAD website. Many analysts today have come to 
blame the plight of developing countries on the special and differential 
measures afforded by the multilateral rules, arguing that accepting the full 
disciplines of GATT/WTO rules would have promoted better performance.  
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their interest will determine the relevance of the WTO to its 
poorer countries.”29  
Furthermore, past negotiations have left a substantial im-
plementation “overhang” that burdens the current round of ne-
gotiations. Developing countries still struggling to comply with 
obligations undertaken in the Uruguay Round would rather 
clear the overhang and deal with the simple core issue of market 
access before embarking on new rules negotiations; this mili-
tates against new rules issues making it onto the Doha agenda. 
The innovation of the Single Undertaking to close the Uru-
guay Round has had the probably unanticipated consequence of 
making the launch of negotiations on new issues more difficult: 
without an “opt-out” option, members are much more cautious 
about agreeing to have an issue put on the WTO negotiating ta-
ble than they were under the previous regime.  By the same to-
ken, members also need to pay close attention to internal politi-
cal considerations at an early stage of the bargaining game.  
Finally, as some observers have pointed out, the change in 
form of the regime from an "agreement" in the GATT era to an 
"organization" in the WTO era—and one tagged with a name 
that many find distant, opaque and connoting power, and thus 
ominous—may have something to do with the fact that the 
WTO has been a lightning rod for protest where the GATT was 
not. As is often the case, the WTO may in some ways be the 
victim of its own success.  Bearing that thought in mind, we 
now turn to a more detailed consideration of the pros and cons 
of including the Singapore four in the Doha Round. 
 
The “Singapore issues” under International Regime Theory 
 
In this section we consider the four issues on an individual ba-
sis, in order of probability of advancing in the near term.  
Handicapped this way, we look at trade facilitation, government 
procurement, trade and investment and trade competition policy 
in turn.   
 
29 Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, p. 385. 
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In terms of the seven functions of international regime the-
ory discussed above, two are primarily relevant at the level of 
the overall regime: namely,  "lengthening the shadow of the fu-
ture" and institutionalizing the rules of cooperation and defec-
tion. These pertain to the negotiating framework and the en-
forcement of rules. The remaining five functions, however, ap-
ply at the specific issue level. 
 
Trade Facilitation 
 
Trade facilitation is the least complicated of the Singapore is-
sues to fit into an international regime framework.  
The preparatory work for negotiations has centred on arti-
cles V (Freedom of Transit), VIII (Fees and Formalities Con-
nected with Importation and Exportation), and X (Publications 
and Administration of Trade Regulations) of the 1994 GATT, 
which address transparency requirements and reducing transac-
tions costs by expediting the movement, release and clearance 
of goods. These are classic roles for an international regime.  
In terms of deflecting pressures, the WTO as an interna-
tional regime would at best play a minor role on this issue 
While an inefficient border does provide some protection for 
domestic import-competing industries, it is an inefficient form 
of protection: it simply generates a dead-weight loss on society 
by raising the costs of trade, as opposed to tariffs that generate 
revenues for government or quantitative restrictions that create 
specific rents for particular domestic interests.30 To be sure, 
 
30 Allan Sykes has addressed the issue of "efficient protection" in his 
paper "Promoting Efficiency through WTO Rule-making", presented at the 
conference Efficiency, Equity and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading Sys-
tem at the Millennium, Center for Business and Government, Harvard Uni-
versity, June 1-2, 2000. The idea is that the WTO removes "distortions" from 
the multilateral system through its preference for fewer instruments of 
greater transparency and predictability, and for instruments that have fewer 
and less deleterious welfare effects -- i.e., non-discriminatory tariffs and sub-
sidies (which create transfer payments) in lieu of quotas or regulatory restric-
tions, which raise rivals' costs and create dead-weight losses through expen-
sive compliance procedures.  
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border controls can be manipulated to provide specific protec-
tion (e.g., slowdown of seasonal goods through arbitrary inspec-
tions) and thus can generate rents; however, there are no domes-
tic constituencies in favour of the general form of inefficiency.  
Conversely, business is exerting substantial pressure on the 
WTO to act in this area. Organizational and technological ad-
vances over the last decades have led to greater specialization 
and geographic fragmentation of supply chains in production. 
As a result production inputs can sometimes cross a border sev-
eral times at different stages of production before reaching their 
final destination. Delays in crossing national boundaries impose 
costs on businesses that are part of such integrated production 
networks,31 especially those relying on “just in time” delivery in 
the post “September 11” era.  
Consequently, any agreement leading to improved customs 
clearance procedures, harmonized tariff nomenclatures, mutual 
recognition of product standards and/or certification procedures 
would represent an efficient step in reducing transaction costs. 
Because of the generally non-controversial nature of improved 
efficiency at the border, one would not expect governments to 
have to lean on the WTO in order to push through reforms. 
At first blush, accordingly, trade facilitation seems to consti-
tute a “win-win” situation. Yet, current talks on this topic are 
not sailing as smoothly as one might expect. The perceived in-
ability by developing countries to implement a WTO customs 
valuation agreement constitutes an impediment to a successful 
negotiation. Developing countries also “have doubts about the 
 
31 M. Doran (1999, “The Simpler Trade Procedures Board” quoted by 
World Trade Agenda, Geneva) reports that customs-related transaction costs 
can represent between 2 and 10 percent of a shipment’s value.  Case studies 
in a number of developing countries and transition economies suggest that 
unofficial payments may raise the marginal tax rate on imported products by 
more than 25 percent (M. Kostecki, 2000, “DHL Worldwide Express: Pro-
viding Just-in-time Services Across Borders in Central and Eastern Europe,” 
in Y. Aharoni and L Nachum, eds., The Globalization of Services: Some 
Implications for Theory and Practice, New York, Routledge). Both studies 
cited in Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, p. 435. 
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value of accepting additional mandatory obligations on trade 
facilitation given weak institutional structures, lack of modern 
communication and information systems, inadequately trained 
staff, and so forth.”32 At the same time, development advocates 
question the allocation of scarce public resources to trade facili-
tation given competing urgent requirements in health, education 
and social services.  
These factors create an opportunity for the WTO as an inter-
national regime to play a positive role in moving liberalization 
forward in the sense that gains to be made from cooperation on 
regulatory issues create the basis for side payments in the form 
of technical and capacity building assistance for least-developed 
countries which face practical implementation problems. 
 
Transparency in Government Procurement 
 
There is little disagreement that transparency in public pro-
curement conveys benefits.33 Yet, some question the value and 
the necessity for a multilateral agreement in this rules area.34  
 
32 Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, p. 440. 
33 Benefits that have identified from a future multilateral agreement on 
transparency in government procurement: (a) innovation amongst bidders 
stimulated by enhanced competition; (b) better value-for-money for govern-
ments and budget savings from more competitive bidding; (c) stimulus for 
formation of partnerships between local and foreign suppliers (especially 
important for developing countries trying to develop their markets); (d) re-
duced corruption as a welcome side-effect for all; (e) entrenchment of good 
governance which is essential to economic development; (e) establishment 
of a minimum set of rules applicable world-wide that would have the effect 
of introducing legal certainty to existing procurement procedures (f) attrac-
tion of more international bidders and foreign investment. See Report (2003) 
of the Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement to the 
General Council. http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_searchResult.asp 
34 Colombia, Peru, Cuba and the Philippines have raised questions in this 
regard. See World Trade Organization, Working Group on Transparency and 
Government Procurement – Report on the Meeting of 18 June 2003 – Note 
by the Secretariat, 7 July 2003 (WT/WGTGP/M/18 para. 20 and para. 22).  
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The WTO already has a plurilateral agreement involving 28 
members on government procurement.35 It contains disciplines 
on discrimination against foreign products or suppliers in gov-
ernment procurement involving purchases above threshold lev-
els that vary by level of government (with lower thresholds in 
the case of central governments.). Key provisions concern 
transparency of laws and tendering procedures, and provisions 
for challenge of procurement decisions by aggrieved private 
bidders seeking redress for decisions they believe were made in 
a manner inconsistent with the rules of the agreement.  
The process launched at Doha is quite separate from the 
GPA. Its scope is limited to transparency, together with devel-
opment-related objectives, including technical assistance and 
capacity building; it does not contemplate restrictions on prefer-
ential treatment to local suppliers in allocating government ac-
quisitions. However, unlike the GPA, it is to be part of the sin-
gle undertaking.   
There are also questions about how well prepared the 
ground is on this issue. For example, agreement has yet to be 
reached on the definition of transparency;36 and views are also 
divided on the scope of the agreement (goods only or including 
services and concessions) as well as on its relationship to other 
WTO agreements and procedures (e.g., several developing 
 
35 The first Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) was negoti-
ated during the Tokyo Round and entered into force on 1 January 1981. The 
present GPA, negotiated in the Uruguay Round and taking effect 1 January 
1996, expanded coverage 10-fold expansion, including to services (e.g., con-
struction), and to procurement by sub-national government and public agen-
cies (including public utilities). See: World Trade Organization, "Under-
standing The WTO: The Agreements; Plurilaterals: Government procure-
ment", http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm10_e.htm, 
accessed April 24, 2004. 
36 This is a valid argument considering that many WTO members are 
hesitant to enter into negotiations without understanding all of its signifi-
cance. Many of them are still uncertain in regards to the obligations they 
have negotiated during the Uruguay Round. 
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countries contend that the agreement should not be subject to 
domestic review procedures or dispute settlement37). 
Considered from the perspective of international regime 
theory, if the majority view is correct that the benefits would far 
outweigh the outlays associated with the introduction of trans-
parency regulations for countries that do not have a procure-
ment system,38 negotiations on this issue would set up the pos-
sibility of side-payments to change the payoffs of the game: this 
could be accomplished, for example, through a richer technical 
assistance and capacity building package.  A sufficiently rich 
offer of side-payments might induce agreement to legally bind-
ing provisions which would hasten the realization of benefits in 
this area.39
However, given the practical implementation concerns of 
developing countries, international regime theory further sug-
gests that “less” might turn out to be “more” in this negotiation. 
Given the long-term success of the GATT/WTO as an interna-
tional regime, and taking account of the neo-structural view of 
the long-term importance of establishing an initial level of co-
operation, however minimal, an initial multilateral agreement of 
limited scope (e.g., goods only, central governments only, 
higher threshold values for developing countries) would pave 
the way for deeper cooperation as time goes on.   
 
 
 
 
37 World Trade Organization, Working Group on Transparency in Gov-
ernment Procurement – Report of the Meeting of 18 June 2003 – Note by the 
Secretariat, 7 July 2003 (WT/WGTP/M/18 para. 12 and para. 13). 
38 This view has been expressed by Canada. See World Trade Organiza-
tion, Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement – Report 
of the Meeting of 18 June 2003 – Note by the Secretariat, 7 July 2003 
(WT/WGTP/M/18 para. 32). 
39 This is a view expressed succinctly by the Japanese delegation. See 
World Trade Organization, Working Group on Transparency in Government 
Procurement – Japan’s View on Transparency in Government Procurement – 
Communication from Japan, 14 October 2002 (WT/WGTP/W/37). 
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Trade and Investment 
 
International regime theory confirms the most obvious argu-
ment in support of formal discussions on the interface between 
trade and investment. The large number of bilateral investment 
treaties that already exist constitute an intricate, uneven and still 
incomplete set of regulations for international investors. A mul-
tilateral agreement (presumably one that goes beyond the mini-
malist Trade-Related Investment Measures, or TRIMs, agree-
ment reached in the Uruguay Round) could therefore, in princi-
ple, reduce transaction costs, both for governments in establish-
ing a seamless set of rules and for businesses in navigating in 
the resulting environment.40
As well, consistent with the function of an international re-
gime to provide information to its members to reduce monitor-
ing and other transaction costs, a fundamental principle of any 
agreement would presumably be transparency. This in itself 
does not appear to pose problems of a sort not already encoun-
tered and overcome in other fields by the GATT/WTO. For ex-
ample, the TRIMs agreement already requires mandatory notifi-
cation of all non-conforming trade-related investment measures 
and establishes a Committee to monitor the implementation of 
commitments under the agreement.41
Nor would there appear to be any particular issues raised by 
extending the fundamental disciplines of the WTO—national 
treatment and most favoured nation (MFN) commitments, to-
 
40 The TRIMs agreement provides that no contracting party shall apply 
any TRIM inconsistent with Articles III (national treatment) and XI (prohibi-
tion of quantitative restrictions) of the GATT, and requires elimination of all 
non-conforming TRIMs within two years for developed countries, within 
five years for developing and within seven years for least-developed. In-
cluded is an illustrative list of TRIMs agreed to be inconsistent with these 
articles including local content requirements and trade balancing require-
ments. See World Trade Organization, Legal texts: the WTO agreements, 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#gproc, accessed 
April 24, 2004. 
41 Ibid. 
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gether with binding of policies.  The TRIMs agreement and the 
hundreds of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) that have been 
signed which typically provide for national treatment are testi-
mony that the basic elements of the GATT/WTO regime can be 
extended with little or no resistance. Going even just this far 
and no further with a multilateral agreement might serve the 
useful purpose of reducing investor uncertainty and thereby re-
ducing risk premia.42
But going any further seems to raise any number of issues. 
First, investment rules overlap significantly with the GATS 
Mode 3: commercial presence. Under this mode of services 
trade, a service is supplied through the establishment of a com-
mercial organization in a consumer’s country of residence. Es-
tablishing a commercial presence requires investment. The ne-
gotiated commitments under investment would accordingly 
have to parallel those made in services, which specify actual 
commitments (positive list approach) rather than making broad 
commitments and listing exceptions. But since foreign direct 
investment is almost universally sought after for goods sector 
production,43 this immediately brings into question the value 
 
42 See J. Francois, 1997, “External Bindings and the Credibility of Re-
forms, in A. Galal and B. Hoekman, Regional Partners in Global Markets, 
London, Centre for Economic Policy Research, and R. Fernandez and J. 
Portes, 1998, “Return to Regionalism: An Analysis of the Nontraditional 
Gains from Regional Trade Agreements,” World Bank Economic Review, 
Vol. 12, pp. 197-220. 
43 For example, nations engage in policies such as tax competition to at-
tract foreign direct investments (FDI)—while this can create positive exter-
nalities such as technological spillovers for local firms, it can have negative 
spillovers on other countries and result in excessive payment to the investor 
leading to an inefficient outcome for the world as a whole. See Theodore 
Moran, 1998, Foreign Direct Investment and Development, Washington, 
DC, Institute for International Economics. Also see B. Aitken and A. Harri-
son, 1999, “Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Foreign Direct Investment?” 
American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No 3, pp. 605-18, and K. Saggi, 2000, 
“Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and International Technology Transfer: 
A Survey,” Policy Research Working Paper No 2349, Washington, DC, 
World Bank. The problem here is not prying open markets, but rather estab-
lishing disciplines on “beggar thy neighbour” behaviour—i.e., obtaining 
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added of an investment agreement if the main area where it 
would have a liberalizing effect is in services, which is already 
being addressed under the GATS. 
Second, to reduce transactions costs significantly, a multi-
lateral agreement would have to supplant the current patchy 
mosaic with, in Sylvia Ostry's words, “a more uniform set of 
rules with broader application, and particularly rules that will 
limit the frequent exclusions taken in investment treaties for 
‘domestic laws, regulations, and policies.’”44  And the last bit of 
that quote represents of course the can of worms that has made 
an agreement on investment so difficult: investment touches on 
a plethora of domestic laws, regulations and policies.  To drill 
down beyond national treatment and MFN is to almost immedi-
ately hit a nerve—or several. For example, investment touches 
on property rights: any intrusion of an international rule into 
domestic law in this area where the status quo invariably re-
flects a finely tuned balance between individual, corporate and 
state interests is an intrusion into a minefield, as illustrated by 
controversies that have been raised in respect of NAFTA Chap-
ter 11 which provides recourse to the courts for changes in gov-
ernment policies unavailable to domestic investors.45
agreement on what type of incentives should be permitted and what types 
constrained. This is a potential minefield for international rules since the 
harsh realities of economic geography (where the "core" is a privileged re-
cipient of FDI compared to the "fringe") lead to unequal results when equal 
rules are applied (to paraphrase Amartya Sen).  The significance of this issue 
has been questioned: political stability, labour costs, and a strong infrastruc-
ture have been found more likely to attract FDI. See D. Wheeler and A. 
Mody, 1992, “International Investment Location Decisions: The Case of US 
Firms,” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 33, pp. 57-76.  
44 Ostry, 1997, p. 218. 
45 This issue has been front and centre for the various non-
governmental organizations, largely environment and development-oriented, 
that have opposed negotiating investment rules going back to the protests 
against the OECD-sponsored initiative for a multilateral agreement on in-
vestment (MAI). These groups worry that an agreement would give “inves-
tors too much scope to oppose and circumvent governments’ regulation 
aimed at social or environmental objectives through provisions on investors-
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This highlights the risks that would be encountered by hav-
ing investment as part of an international regime.  Regimes fa-
cilitate issue linkage, which in this instance would allow con-
cessions in other areas to provide leverage for movement on 
investment rules.46 But unlike the situation with tariff cutting, 
the trade-offs might not always be between competing commer-
cial interests but between commercial interests and issues that 
particular societies have chosen to leave outside the commercial 
realm. Succinctly put, the core concern of those “outside the 
fences,”47 is not that the WTO agreements will open up markets 
where they already exist, but that they will introduce markets 
where they do not exist. The remaining feature of an interna-
tional regime to discuss in this connection, namely its capacity 
to deflect domestic lobby pressures, may not actually deflect 
pressures in this type of circumstance but simply arouse a storm 
of protest aimed at the WTO. 
 
 
 
State dispute resolutions." See Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, p. 424. See 
also S. Kobrin, 1998, “The MAI and the Clash of Globalization,” Foreign 
Policy, Vol. 112, pp. 97-109, and Mark Vallianatos et al., License to Loot: 
The MAI and How to Stop It, Washington, DC, Friends of the Earth. 
[http://www.foe.org/res/pubs/pdf/loot.pdf]. 
46  This is even hinted at in the name of the working group, which is not 
‘investment liberalisation,” but “relationship between trade and investment.” 
By creating linkages between trade and investment policies, national leaders 
could promote a liberal agenda by “tying their hands” to an international 
agreement. Specifically, “an agreement can be a valuable tool for govern-
ments that are hostage to local incumbents that oppose foreign entry by be-
ing part of a ‘grand bargain’. As FDI and trade are increasingly two sides of 
the same coin, rules should focus on the full set of policies that affect actors’ 
decisions – both trade and investment-related regulations." Hoekman and 
Kostecki, 2001, p. 420. 
47 To borrow a term popularized by Naomi Klein to depict protesters 
who advocate an alternative vision of globalization. See Naomi Klein, 2002, 
Fences and Windows: Dispatches from the Front Lines of the Globalization 
Debate, New York, Picador USA. 
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Trade and Competition Policy 
 
Competition policy would appear to be the fourth seed amongst 
the Singapore four, being the least advanced in terms of achiev-
ing consensus on scope and having all the intrusiveness of in-
vestment without the major offsetting attraction of larger FDI 
inflows which an investment agreement implicitly promises--
the benefits flowing from enhanced competition are with rare 
exceptions48 diffuse, long-term in nature and hard to directly 
attribute to specific instruments or policy interventions. 
Competition policy is far from new to the WTO: several 
existing agreements already contain related provisions including 
the Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), the Trade-
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the GATS and the 
Telecommunications Reference Paper. Under TRIMs and 
GATS, members are only obligated, on request, to enter into 
consultations with a view to eliminate business practices that 
are deemed to restrict trade. There is no requirement to act, only 
an obligation to provide information.  
To go further, an agreement on trade and competition 
would have to establish some points of commonality without 
going so far as to attempt harmonization of national laws 
(which has been categorically rejected as an objective of the 
exercise49). The work has thus aimed to establish "a set of prin-
 
48 For example, one might see immediately lower prices in the wake of 
the break-up of a cartel. 
49 As the Working Group put it in its report to the General Council in 
2003, "..because markets and culture were inseparable, and differed from 
country to country, … a multilateral framework on competition policy would 
have to take cognisance of, and accommodate, a substantial degree of plu-
ralism in national competition policies, especially among developing coun-
tries, in addition to other, sometimes more interventionist, policies that ex-
isted to support development." (emphasis added). See World Trade Organi-
zation, "Report (2003) of the Working Group on the Interaction Between 
Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council", WT/WGTCP/7, 17 
July 2003; at para 18; also see para 16. This position is buttressed by theo-
retical considerations: because of differing social preferences, it is not clear 
that international harmonization of market regulation will increase welfare. 
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ciples that would embody common values and promote coop-
erative approaches to competition law enforcement that were in 
the interest of all Members, while respecting the extensive dif-
ferences that prevailed in economic and legal circumstances and 
cultures."50 And insofar as the implementation of a competition 
regime mandated by multilateral obligations would present an 
administrative burden for developing countries, the additional 
WTO principles of flexibility and progressivity of frameworks 
would come into play, supported by technical assistance and 
capacity building pursuant to commitments made at Doha.51
Assessing prospects for forward movement is difficult. On 
the one hand, some delegations have pointed out that their com-
petition laws and/or policies are already consistent with the 
WTO core principles of non-discrimination, transparency, and 
due process—which in fact have been described as universal 
principles of sound governance—without in any way compro-
mising their ability to tailor their legislation to address their 
own particular circumstances. Indeed, in the deliberations of the 
Working Group, it has been suggested that developed countries 
should unilaterally commit to the core principles since most 
would face few compliance issues.52  Yet, in the deliberations of 
the Working Group, there has been much probing into the op-
erational implications and possible broad ramifications of sign-
ing onto such obligations. And the concerns here have not only 
According to Hoekman and Kostecki (2001, 415-16), “in contrast to trade 
policy – where there are clear-cut policy recommendations – when it comes 
to regulation and market structure there are few hard and fast rules of thumb 
that governments can rely on to ensure that agreements enhance welfare. In 
part, this is because different interests are affected when it comes to regula-
tion […]. Preferences across societies will differ across countries depending 
on local circumstances, tastes, and conditions.” (emphasis added). 
50 World Trade Organization, "Report (2003) of the Working Group on 
the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy to the General Coun-
cil", op cit.; at para 16. 
51 Ibid, at para 21. 
52 Ibid. at para 22. 
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the developing countries cautious of taking on administrative 
obligations that would be costly or otherwise burdensome. The 
US, for example, has sought clarification of the meaning of 
"transparency" in terms of reporting requirements in respect of 
the hundreds of relevant cases each year at all levels of the fed-
eral judiciary.53 Common law countries have questioned the in-
terpretation of the non-discrimination principle in their context 
where "the 'law' consisted of both statutes written in broad lan-
guage and judicial decisions interpreting such statutes?"54
The difficulty in achieving consensus on this issue, despite 
every evidence of serious engagement and informed debate 
within the Working Group (not to mention within the OECD 
which has been grappling with this issue for many years), 
would appear to reflect in part the myriad issues raised by the 
general intrusiveness of international rules (in this area or oth-
ers) and in part by the complexity of the subject matter in this 
particular area which in turn reflects the non-specificity of the 
concept of competition policy.  
While the problem of intrusiveness is perhaps best illus-
trated by the sheer number of detailed concerns raised by differ-
ent parties, one example suffices to bring out the difficulty of 
establishing even an apparently universal principle such as "fair 
and equitable procedure": As the working Group has acknowl-
edged, ".. this was a particularly difficult subject area because 
notions of fundamental fairness in the context of law enforce-
ment disciplines such as competition law differed across legal 
systems." 55 Some of the questions raised in the Working Group 
about the interpretation of procedural fairness have included the 
following:  Would rights extend solely to those subject to ad-
verse decisions?  Would third-parties have rights in some cases? 
Would a right to appeal administrative decisions by competition 
authorities include the review of decisions not to pursue com-
plaints?  
 
53 Ibid. at para. 23. 
54 Ibid. at para. 29. 
55 Ibid. at para. 35.  
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In the particular case of competition policy, these problems 
are compounded by the uncertainty about scope. A narrow in-
terpretation of the relationship between trade and competition 
policy would limit the focus to competition laws; these typically 
include provisions against anti-competitive market behaviour 
(e.g., abuse of dominant market position and collusive practices 
such as cartels) and anti-trust provisions applying in respect of 
mergers and acquisitions. A broader interpretation would in-
clude “the set of measures and instruments used by govern-
ments that determine the conditions of competition that reign on 
their markets.”56 These could, for example, include privatization 
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), deregulation of markets, and 
controls on subsidy programs.  Many of the issues raised in the 
Working Group's deliberations are with the ramifications for 
areas such as industrial policy (e.g., that the non-discrimination 
principle not somehow reach into policies to nurture develop-
ment).  The responses in the Working Group to these kind of 
concerns include pointing to the ability to list exceptions and 
also to a distinction between de jure and de facto violations of 
the non-discrimination principle: only the former would be ad-
dressed in the proposed multilateral framework, because, ad-
dressing de facto instances of discrimination could introduce "a 
host of problems."57 At the same time, reflecting the usual point 
of the devil being in the detail, the Working Group noted "As to 
the concerns expressed regarding how the distinction between 
de jure and de facto violations would work in practice, the point 
was made that it was difficult or impossible to provide defini-
tive answers to the kinds of detailed questions which had been 
 
56 Hoekman and Kostecki, 2002, p. 425. In the context of the discussion 
in the Working Group, it has been pointed out that eschewing to enact a 
competition law, which small, very open economies such as Hong Kong 
have chosen to do, is not the same as not having a competition policy. 
57 World Trade Organization, "Report (2003) of the Working Group on 
the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy to the General Coun-
cil", op cit.; at para 26. 
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posed concerning a prospective legal text before a negotiation 
had begun."58
These sorts of issues are not new, of course, in the WTO, 
having already been breached in the context of previous agree-
ments (e.g., the GATS) without forcing harmonization of laws. 
What then might international regime theory have to say about 
the prospects for progress in this area? 
First, it might be noted that the sustained process of discus-
sion of this issue since the formation of the Working Group fol-
lowing the Singapore WTO Ministerial is itself an illustration of 
the way the WTO as an international regime is promoting coop-
eration. Discussion and sharing of experiences is after all a pre-
liminary form of cooperation. 
Secondly, as the exchange of information within the Work-
ing Group has served to highlight, the Nordic countries have 
recently provided a quintessential example of progressive inter-
national cooperation in this subject area. Cooperation among the 
Nordic competition authorities started in the late 1970s/early 
1980s with biannual meetings of the heads of the national com-
petition authorities simply to discuss topics of mutual concern. 
This led to the establishment in 1998 of a committee to propose 
ways to deepen cooperation.  In 2000 the parties adopted 
non-binding guidelines regarding the exchange of 
non-confidential information and co-ordination in carrying out 
investigations, including making so-called "dawn raids" on each 
other's behalf. Pursuant to these initiatives, practical coopera-
tion has in fact deepened, with information exchange and co-
ordination of investigations having become routine in all impor-
 
58 Ibid. at para 31. It was also pointed out in the Working Group's de-
liberations that, to the extent compliance with the WTO regime in respect of, 
say, the hard-core cartel issue were tested under the dispute settlement 
mechanism, it would be the presence on the statutes of the country of a law 
against such cartels, not whether the law was being enforced, that could be 
the basis of a complaint.  Insofar as the WTO obligations were enforceable, 
peer pressure aside, it would be through the DSU.   
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tant competition cases, with positive results, particularly with 
respect to hardcore cartel cases.59  
This experience illustrates the importance that IRT attaches 
to establishing a minimal extent of cooperation as the basis for 
deeper cooperation as mutual trust is built through repeated ex-
changes. The Nordic experience also illustrates the importance 
of even apparently shallow forms of cooperation (e.g., exchange 
of non-confidential information) and patience with gradual pro-
gress.  Considered in this light, and considering the diversity of 
the WTO's membership compared to the Nordic community, the 
WTO's progress on this issue since the Singapore Ministerial 
might well be judged to be very good. 
IRT also suggests that the approach being mooted with the 
Working Group is sound: proactive engagement by developed 
countries would "entice developing countries to willingly join 
the multilateral competition structure, and establish the founda-
tion for regional cooperation."60 This is but a successful regime 
expanding by demonstrating its value.  
Such gradual accretion of members would be supported by 
technical assistance and capacity building, illustrating again the 
capacity of the WTO regime to alter the payoff of a game. 
One standard function of an international regime would 
have to be used carefully since in some cases it would appear to 
be in distinctly counter-productive, namely the use of the WTO 
to deflect domestic pressures.  Insofar as the WTO were leaned 
on to take action against injurious anti-competitive practices in 
the domestic sphere, this would be consistent with the standard 
benefit of an international regime. However, if the WTO were 
used to justify introduction of competition laws in the face of 
competing objectives in the social domain, it would be open to 
criticism that might be difficult to answer given the difficulty of 
making tradeoffs between social and economic objectives. As 
Hoekman and Kostecki note: “while governments may seek to 
agree on common regulatory principles to govern behavior of 
 
59 Ibid. at para 63. 
60 Ibid. at para 75. 
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public entities or restrict the use of domestic policies, this is 
best done directly and should not be made a precondition for 
trade liberalization.”61
Overall, the promotion of international cooperation in the 
field of competition policy can benefit through a WTO initiative 
to address the interface between trade and competition policy. 
The caveat is that patience is likely to be especially important in 
this domain. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Five major conclusions emerge from consideration of the Sin-
gapore issues through the lens of international regime theory. 
First, the WTO is in many ways the quintessential interna-
tional regime; the introduction of the Singapore issues onto its 
agenda is in many ways a reflection of its past success. 
Second, the WTO is well placed as an international regime 
to promote international cooperation in the subject areas ad-
dressed by these issues. Many of the functions of an interna-
tional regime lend themselves well to building cooperation in 
respect of each. 
Third, insofar as IRT emphasizes the importance of small 
beginnings, patient confidence building through shallow forms 
of cooperation such as information exchange, and gradual deep-
ening of cooperation, it is premature to declare failure on the 
Singapore issues because a formal launch was not agreed at 
Cancún; indeed, to do so would be to completely overlook the 
cooperation that is already "in the bank" in the form of the de-
liberations of the Working Groups since their inception follow-
ing the Singapore Ministerial.  
Fourth, insofar as these issues are to be advanced through 
linkage to other issues, it is not at all evident that being bundled 
together was an asset; the effective unbundling of these issues at 
Cancún may therefore represent an important positive develop-
 
61 Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, p. 453. 
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ment in terms of allowing each to be linked into trade-offs with 
other issues on its own merits. 
Fifth, seen through an IRT lens, the Singapore four are 
quite different in terms of the problems that must be overcome 
to build cooperation. There is no good reason to believe that 
each of these issues has the same "gestation period" in terms of 
confidence building before being ready to move to the stage of 
formal obligations.  Accordingly, there was no inherent reason 
to expect that they could be advanced in lockstep. By the same 
token, the differentiated timetable going forward that was im-
plicit in the compromise proposal put forward at Cancún by the 
facilitator for the issues represents a positive development in 
moving towards a process better suited to each. 
Launching formal negotiation on some or all of the Singa-
pore issues at the Cancún would have reinforced the WTO re-
gime, held out the promise of early benefits for WTO members 
individually and the global economy as a whole, and hastened a 
deepening of multilateral cooperation that is likely to prove in-
evitable in the longer run.  At the same time, inclusion of these 
issues in an inadequately prepared form on the Doha Develop-
ment Agenda as a bundled group subject to the single undertak-
ing would have carried its own risk for a timely completion of 
the round.  
So to answer the question in the title of this chapter: should 
we be cheering for the demise of the Singapore issues?  The an-
swer to which the analysis above leads is rather that we should 
cheer for the liberation of the Singapore four from a bundling 
that was probably unsustainable and that could have constituted 
a poison pill for the Doha Development Agenda.  Each can now 
be considered on its own merits and allowed to mature at its 
own pace.  The very real record of international cooperation 
achieved since the Singapore Ministerial is the main payoff to 
the 1996 initiative.  None of that was lost at Cancún ; it serves 
as the base from which to move forward.   
 
